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over the Life Cycle:
A Preliminary Analysis
Whilestudies of the distribution of personal nonhuman wealth in the
United States have been few,' those studies available have consistently
shown a high degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth.2 The most
recent complete study of the U.S. wealth distribution, a 1962 Federal
Reserve survey,3 measured a Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribu-
tion of personal wealth among consumer units to be .76 (this compares
with a Gini coefficient of .43 for the distribution of income in the same
year).4 This study indicated that the top 1/2 of 1 percent of U.S.
consumer units owned 22 percent of the personal wealth, the top 2.5
percentwealth-owning consumer units owned 43 percent of the personal
wealth, while the net worth of the bottom 10 percent of U.S. consumer
units was negative. (See Table 1.)
Together with a concentration of wealth among a relatively few
persons among the population as a whole, there is a concentration of
NOTE:Theauthoris a graduate studentas the University of Wisconsin-Madison.















$1 to $999 9.0 16
a
1,000 to 4,999 10.8 19 2
5,000 to 9,999 9.1 16 5
10,000 to 24,999 13.3 23 18
25,000 to 49,999 6.2 11 18
50,000 to 99,999 2.5 4 14
100,000 to 199,999 0.7 1 8
200,000 to 499,999 0.5 1 13
500,000 andover 0.2
a 22
SOURCE: Dorothy S. Projector and Gertrude S. Weiss, Surveyof Financial Characteristics of
Consumers, Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 1966, Tables A-2,
p. 98; A-16, p. 136; A-36, p. 151.
NOTE: Sums of tabulated figures in this section may not equal totals because of rounding.
than 8 of 1 percent.
wealth by age group; the consumer units headed by a person 35 or
younger in 1962 owned 7 percent of the personal wealth, yet constituted
22 percent of the nation's consumer units. In contrast, those consumer
units headed by a person aged 55 or older constituted 35 percent of the
nation's population, but owned 56 percent of the personal wealth.5
Moreover, while there is a concentration of total wealth among the older
age cohorts, the degree of wealth ownership inequality within a given age
cohort as measured by the Gini coefficient is relatively consistent, with
Gini coefficients for the age cohorts ranging from .83 to .70.6
While age and differing wealth accumulation functions have been
employed to explain inter-age cohort wealth differences, the role of
inter-generational wealth transfers in wealth distribution inequality over
the life cycle has been largely ignored.7 In this paper, I examine the
possible role of inter-generational wealth transfers in explaining the
constant inequality of wealth distribution observed for all cohorts during
the life cycle.
The importance of inter-generational wealth transfers in wealth
inequality can be approached by considering what the distribution of
wealth would be like in a hypothetical society in which all inter-
generational physical wealth transfers were forbidden. In such a society,
398 Osmanj
the life-cycle accumulation of wealth of an individual or family unit would
start from a very low level early in the life cycle, would accumulate, peak
at a period before retirement, and wealth stocks would be consumed
during retirement until death (Figure 1). The total wealth of a family unit
FIGURE 1Accumulation of Wealth for




SOURCE:A. B. Atkinson, "The Distribution of Wealth and the
Individual Life Cycle," Oxford Economic Papers 23 (July
1971): 239—254.
orindividual could be reduced to a function of savings, return on savings,
and age; in equation form, this wealth relationship may be expressed as
[{[s1(1 +R1)+s2](1 +R2)}+SN]14-RN...
where
S is the net saving of the unit in a given year;
R is the rate of return on the savings; and
N is the number of years that the unit has been saving.
In such a hypothetical society, while inequalities in the distribution of
physical wealth would not disappear, such inequalities that did exist
would be due to age, differing savings rates, and differing rates of return
on savings, rather than inter-generational wealth transfers.8
In such a society, it would be expected that as a given cohort of the
population aged, the inequality in the distribution of wealth within a given
cohort would increase, as the impact of age and differing wealth accumu-
lation rates within the cohort took effect. Inequality in the distribution of
wealth within a given age cohort would be expected to be greatest in the
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Ageolder cohorts, where the life-cycle factors would have had the longest
time to make an impact, and least in the youngest cohorts. Wealth in such
a hypothetical society would be concentrated in the control of the aged,
with the younger cohorts of the population having little of the society's
total wealth. Finally, the average amount of wealth owned by units within
each cohort would increase until retirement, and then be drawn down.9
d
THE U.S. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
ContemporaryAmerica's wealth distribution agrees with the general
distribution that would result in such a hypothetical society in that the 6,
nation's wealth is concentrated in the hands of the aged,1° and in that the
average asset holdings per consumer unit increase with age." —
Wherethe U.S. differs from the hypothetical society with no inter- S(
generational wealth transfers is in the degree of wealth ownership
inequality within the various age cohorts; instead of wealth inequality
increasing within the cohort as the cohort aged, as in our hypothetical
society, the degree of wealth ownership inequality, as measured by the
Gini coefficient, remains relatively fixed over the life cycle. What
accounts for the high degree of inequality in wealth ownership observed
for the younger age cohorts? The issue I wish to explore is: What is the
role of inter-generational wealth transfers in explaining the constant high




Inter-generationalwealth transfer occurs both during the life of both
parties in the transfer process, and at the death of one. The three main
methods of wealth transfer available are trust funds, transfers by the
processes of direct inheritance, and transfers through gifts given while the
donor is still alive.
While very little information exists on the importance of inter-
generational wealth transfers in the U.S. distribution of wealth, a recent
analysis of the information contained in the 1962 Federal Reserve Survey
provides some information on trusts and direct inheritances in the form of
estates in probate.'3 The analysis breaks down wealth holding by type of
asset form, and by age group for individuals; Table 2 shows what
400IOsmanTABLE 2Importance of Trusts and Estates in Probate as a
Percentage of the Total Wealth Owned by the
Age Cohort, Individuals. 1962
Age
Cohort
Percentage of Total Wealth
of the Cohort Held in the
Form of Trusts and Estates
Percentage of the Total Personal









SOURCE: Table V-4, Tables V.13 to V-20; in Appendix 5, "The Distribution of Assets Among Individuals of
Different Age and Wealth," in Raymond W. Goldsmith, ed., Institutional Investors and Corporate
Stock, pp. 394—427 (New York: NBER, 1973).
percentage of personal U.S. wealth in 1962 was owned by which age
cohort, and what percentage of the total assets of each age cohort was in
the form of trust funds and estates in probate.'4
From Table 2, it appears that inter-generational wealth transfers in the
form of trusts and estates in probate are an important asset source for the
youngest age cohorts; after the age of 45, trusts and estates in probate are
a minor asset source. This table indicates that inter-generational wealth
transfers could be a factor in explaining the high degree of wealth-
ownership inequality observed in the younger age cohorts.
TRUSTFUNDS
Datafor 1972 indicated that in that year minimum gross transfers by the
inheritance process totaled 38.8 billion dollars, while in 1970 trust funds
earned 7.5billiondollars in income.'5 Total funds held in personal trusts
in 1968 were estimated to be 138 billion dollars, and have been growing
rapidly.'6 From the individual analysis of the 1962 Federal Reserve
Survey data, it appears that the device of trust funds is an important factor
in explaining the high degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth
observed among the younger age cohorts.
Moreover, trust fund assets are highly concentrated. In 1969, the top
1/2 of 1 percent of U.S. wealth-holding adults owned 85percentof the
value of alltrustfund assets, and 92 percent of the value of trust funds
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-were owned by the top 1 percent of the U.S. adult wealth holders.'7 Trust
assets appear to be an important asset source for very wealthy young
persons.
18
Table 3 summarizes the 1962 data on trust funds as an asset source for
individuals. From this table, it appears that trust funds are a minor asset
source for almost all individuals in all age cohorts possessing less than
$200,000 in assets. However, for those individuals under the age of 44,
and with more than $200,000 in assets, it appears that trust funds are an
important asset source.'9
r
TABLE 3Percentage of Assets Held in the Form of Trusts of
Individuals in 1962 by Age and Asset Level
Age
Asset Level 0—25 25—3435—4444—5555—6464+
$30,000 to $60,000 3.38 1.8
a a i.os —
60,000to 100,000 18.14
a a 1.0
100,000 to 200,000 —
a 1.75
a
200,000 to 500,000 30.76 8.78 3.62 .005 .032 2.11
500,000 to 1,000,000 13.7113.6081.762.09
a a
1,000,000+
b 93.68 12.07 2.65 5.24 1.48
Percentage of all assets
of all age and wealth
levels in the form of
trusts 5.02 18.2 5.9 .071 1.29
a
SOURCE: Tables V- 13 to V-20, pp. 413—428, in Appendix 5, "The Distribution of Assets Among Individuals
of Different Age and Wealth," in Raymond W. Goldsmith, ed., Institutional Investors and Corporate
Stock(NewYork: NBER, 1973).
than 1 percent.
bSee note 18, end of text.
After age 44, trust fund assets become a relatively insignificant asset
form for all wealth levels, with no more than 5.25percentof the assets of
any post age 44 cohort being held in the form of trust funds, with trust
assets relative to total assets declining with age for all asset classes.20
Further information on the importance of trust funds as an asset source
for individual wealth holders with assets of greater than $200,000 is in
data on the distribution of assets of all individuals in 1962. While trusts
were only 3.3 percent of the assets of all individuals, they constituted 13.7
percent of all assets of those individuals with between $500,000 and
$1,000,000 in assets, and 13.5 percent of the assets of millionaires and
multimillionaires.2' Moreover, a special Treasury study22 of 1957 and
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-1959 estate tax returns revealed that, taken as a class, between 54 and 56
percent of the millionaires created one or more trusts contingent upon
their death, and that trust formation increased steadily with the size of the
millionaires' assets; while between 51 and 53 percent of the millionaires
with $1,000,000 in assets created trusts, 64 to 77 percent of the
millionaires with assets of $10,000,000 or more created trusts.23
The amount of the trusts created in the estate as a percentage of the
total estate after taxes increased steadily with wealth level, with those
millionaires with more than $10,000,000 in assets placing nearly a third of
their total assets in trust.24 Furthermore, trust usage increased with the
size of the estate among all top wealth holders; for estates of between
$100,000 and $300,000, only 13—16 percent of the estates created trusts,
but 54—56 percent of the millionaires' estates created trusts.25
As over 80 percent of the trusts studied in the 1957 and 1959 estate
returns expired within one generation,26 with the majority of the trust
fund assets going to members of the decedent's family, trust funds can be
viewed as an important method of inter-generational wealth transfer.27
DIRECTINHERITANCE
Whiletrusts are an important means of inter-generational wealth trans-
fer, direct inheritance, as measured by annual absolute amounts, is more
important. Survey data for the American population as a whole has
indicated that inheritance is a minor source of assets; some 80 percent of
the U.S. population claims never to have inherited any assets, and only 1
percent of the population as a whole admits to having inherited assets of
$25,000 or more.28 Such data have led scholars to discount the role of
inheritance in the distribution of wealth and income.29
Most inheritances are apparently received late in life;30 while only 8
percent of spending units have inherited by the age of 25, over 40 percent
of the spending units aged 75 or older have inherited.3' For those few that
inherit more than $25,000, the largest increase in inheritance comes in
the age cohort 5 5—64, indicating an inter-generational transmission of
wealth late in the life cycle.
While the largest inheritors (those receiving inheritances of $100,000
or more) are concentrated in the older age cohorts (ages 45 to64),32 this
tells nothing of the relative importance of inheritance to the top
wealth-holding classes.
Some information is available from an analysis of the 1962 Federal
Reserve Board study of individual asset holdings;33 the asset class labeled
"estates in probate" gives a direct measure of some of the inter-
Inter-generationalWealth Transfers 403generational wealth transfers via inheritance occurring in that particular
year.34
The analysis of the 1962 data revealed that for all individuals under the
age of 25, estates in probate made up only 3.6 percent of the total wealth
but comprised 56.87 percent of the wealth of individuals with assets of
between $30,000 and $60,000, and 15.7 percent of the assets of
individuals with assets of between $500,000 and $1,000,000 in this age
group.
For all individuals aged 25 to 34, estates in probate totaled 3.56
percent of the total wealth but comprised 59 percent of the wealth of
individuals in this age class with assets of between $200,000 and
$500,000.
After age 35, estates in probate are 1 percent or less of the asset forms
of individuals, except for those aged 44—55 with between $60,000 and
$100,000 in assets; estates in probate were 3 percent of the assets of this
class.35
From this data, it appears that direct inheritance, as measured by the
asset form "estates in probate," is of greater importance as an asset
source for wealthy individuals under the age of 35 than for other persons.
The apparent conifict between the 1962 survey data and the surveys on
inheritance as to when in the life cycle most inheritances are received can
be resolved, inasmuch as for the older cohorts, the relative importance of
inheritance is less, because these persons usually already have substantial
assets; hence, an asset class such as "estates in probate," while large in
absolute terms for the older cohorts, will be smaller in relative terms. It is
for this reason that inheritance earlier in the life cycle is a relatively more
important source of assets for the younger cohorts.
Support for the contention that inheritance is an important source of
assets for top wealth holders comes from survey data in Table 4. From
this table, it appears that inherited assets are of little importance for the
97.5 percent of the population with assets of less than $100,000. No more
than 24 percent of the consumer units in any asset class below $100,000
would admit to any inheritance, and 12 percent was the highest number in
any asset class below the $100,000 asset level that would admit to having
inherited a "substantial" share of their current assets.
However, when one examines the data on inheritance relating to the
2.5 percent of U.S. wealth-holding consumer units that own 43 percent of
the nation's wealth, it becomes apparent that inheritance plays an
increasingly larger role in explaining the assets of a consumer unit as the
wealth of the consumer unit increases.
While 22 percent of the consumer units with assets of $100,000 to
$199,000 admit to having inherited a "substantial" portion of their
current assets, 34 percent of the top wealth-holding class (assets,
Osman
SI
LTABLE 4Inherited Assets in Relation to Total Assets,
December 31, 1962







All units 100 83 16 12 5
a
Size of wealth:
$ 1—$999 100 95 5 5
a a
1,000—4,999 100 87 12 9 4
a
5,000—9,999 100 82 18 12 6
a
10,000—24,999 100 77 23 17 6
a
25,000—49,999 100 75 24 16 9
a
50,000—99,999 100 74 24 12 12 2
100,000—199,999 100 46 54 32 22
°
200,000—499,999 100 59 41 28 13
a
500,000 and over 100 39 59 24 34 2
1962 income:
$ 0—$2,999 100 84 16 10 6
a
3,000—4,999 100 88 12 9 3
a
5,000—7,499 100 84 16 12 4
a
7,500—9,999 100 80 20 14 5
a
10,000—14,999 100 84 16 11 5
a
15,000—24,999 100 73 27 21 6
a
25,000—49,999 100 58 42 34 8
a
50,000—99,999 100 71 26 12 14 3
100,000 and over 100 31 66 9 57 2
Age of head:
Under 35 100 91 9 8 1
a
35—44 100 87 13 9 3
a
45—54 100 83 17 12 4
a
55—64 100 75 24 17 7 1
65andover 100 79 21 12 9
a
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SOURCE:D. S. Projector and G.S.Weiss, Surveyof Financial Characteristics of Consumers, TableA-32, p.
148(Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of she Federal Reserve System, 1966),
than I of 1 percent.T
$500,000+)state that a substantial portion of their assets came from
inheritance, and 59percentof this wealth-holding class admits to having
inherited at least some portion of their current assets.36
A crude quantitative measure of the importance of inter-generational
wealth transfers in the distribution of wealth at various stages of the life
cycle, and by asset level, can be established by combining the 1962 data
for individuals of the share of assets held in the form of trusts and the
share of assets held in the form of estates in probate. These two asset
forms, for all individuals in all age and asset classes, constitute 4.11
percent of all asset value in However, for the top wealth-holding
individuals, inter-generational wealth transfers, only a portion of which
are measured by the data on assets in trust and estates in probate, are
given below in Table 5for1962.
TABLE5Percentage of Assets Held in the Form of Trusts and
Estates of Individuals in 1962 by Age and Asset Level





$30,000 to$59,999 59.87 1.8 — 3.65 1.1 —
60,000 to 99,999 18.0 — — — — —
100,000 to 199,999 — — 1.8 — 2.2 —
200,000to499,999 30.7668.23 3.6 — 1.1 2.1
500,000 to 999,999 29.4 13.6 81.92 2.31 2.3 —
1,000,000+ 12.0 4.1 6.0 1.4
SOURCE: Tables V.13 to V-20, pp. 413-428 in Appendix 5, "The Distribution of Assets Among Individuals
of Different Age and Wealth," in Raymond W. Goldsmith, ed., Insdtutionallnvestorsand Corporate
Stock (New York: NI3ER, 1973).
8See note 18, end of text.
From this incomplete evidence, inter-generational wealth transfers in
the form of trusts and estates appear to be an important source of assets
for those wealth holders with wealth of over $200,000—in particular, for
young top wealth holders. The inference from Table 5isthat without the
existence of these inter-generational wealth transfers, the distribution of
wealth in the cohorts under age 45 would be more equal than it is now.
INTER-VIVOSGIFTS
Whilemost inter-generational wealth transfers apparently still occur at
the death of one of the generations involved, the possibility exists for
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Ilarge-scale undetected inter-generational wealth transfers in the form of
gifts to occur while the donor is still alive. Through such lifetime giving,
large amounts of wealth can be transferred between generations, en-
abling wealth inequality to persist and develop anew in younger age
cohorts.
Federal law only requires that a gift tax return be filed if the giver of the
gift gives one individual more than $3,000 in gifts in any one year; a donor
of gifts could give less than $3,000 each to as many persons as he desired
and not be required to file a federal gift tax return.38 These exemptions
would enable large-scale gift giving over long periods of time to go
undetected by federal data on gifts.
For example, if a man with five children gave each child $3,000 per year
over a thirty-year period, each child would have received $90,000 in gifts,
and the father would have given away $450,000. Under federal law, his
wife could also give away to each child $3,000 per year, per child (a total
of $450,000). In addition to the $3,000 annual tax-free gifts each parent
could give to their children, each parent could also give away up to a total
of $30,000 to a single child or to the children, in various amounts,
additional, tax-free, once in the parents' lifetimes.39 The end result would
be a total of $960,000 transferred from parents to children, and no
federal gift or inheritance taxes paid on this transfer of wealth.
What little and incomplete data on inter-vivos gifts exists indicates that
lifetime gift giving is growing, and is potentially a very important method
of inter-generational wealth transference.
Data for 1965 indicated that some 3.9 billion dollars in lifetime gifts
were large enough to be required to file federal gift tax returns.40
Between 1963 and 1966, total amount of lifetime gifts subject to the.
gift-tax filing requirement increased 49.5 percent and the number of
returns increased 31.6 percent. If these trends have continued since 1965,
the total amount of gifts subject to the federal gift-tax filing requirement
would total over eight billion dollars by the early 1970s.4'
Of the 3.9 billion dollars in gifts in 1965 subject to the federal gift-tax
filing requirements, 3.1 billion, or over 75 percent, went to donees other
than spouses or charities; hence this 3.1 billion dollar total gives some
idea of the minimum amount involved in the annual inter-generational
transfer of wealth via lifetime giving.42
Moreover, the 1965 gift tax data indicate that large sums were being
transferred by means of lifetime gift giving to individuals other than
spouses of the donors. In 1965, 536 donors gave gifts of $500,000 or
more (238 giving gifts of more than $1,000,000), and 3,684 gave gifts
of between $100,000 and $500,000. The possibilities of the giving
of such large amounts of wealth resulting in the formation of a new
generation of top wealth holders is obvious; several such years of
Inter-generationalWealth Transfers 407
. .large-scale gift giving would result in the donee being in the top 1 percent
of U.S. wealth holders.43
Additional information on the transfer of wealth via lifetime gift giving
comes from a special Treasury study matching estate and gift tax returns
of individual taxpayers in 1957 and 1959. This study showed that as the
size of the gross estate increased, the percentage of decedents in that
estate class who had made lifetime gifts rose steadily. While only 10
percent of the owners of estates of $300,000 or less had given away gifts
some time during their lifetimes, 52 percent of all millionaires had, and 92
per cent of those millionaires with wealth of over 10 million dollars had
some time during their lives made gifts.44
Duration of lifetime giving followed the same general pattern as the
frequency of lifetime giving; as asset levels increased, the longer the
period of time that the decedent had been engaged in lifetime giving.45
However, the 1957—59 Treasury study indicated that at least for those
two years, lifetime gifts were a small amount relative to the total value of
the decedent's estate. Gifts totaled only 2.7 percent of the total value of
the estates in the $300,000 asset level, and rose to only 7.5 percent of the
estate value in the millionaire class.46 This indicates that while substantial
tax advantages exist in the giving of gifts during life, as compared to
leaving the same amount of money at death (gift tax rates are only 75
percent of the comparable federal estate tax rates) inter-vivos gift giving
was a relatively infrequent method of wealth transfer as recently as the
late 1950s. However, the 1965 federal gift tax data indicate a rapid rise in
lifetime giving, such that a considerable amount could be being trans-
ferred via lifetime gift giving at the present time.
CONCLUSIONS
Thispaper began by examining the possible role of inter-generational
wealth transfers in explaining the high and persistent degree of inequality
in wealth ownership measured over the life cycle. From the data
analyzed, it appears that inter-generational wealth transfers in the form
of trusts and inheritances are a relatively more important asset source for
younger persons (in particular those pre age 45 cohorts) and an especially
important asset source for young top wealth holders (wealth holders
younger than age 45 with more than $200,000 in assets). It appears that
without inter-generational wealth transfers, the assets of young top
wealth holders under age 45 might be severely reduced. To the extent
that the concentration of assets in the control of young top wealth holders
is a source of the high degree of inequality in wealth ownership observed
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1•Iin the under age 45cohorts,the elimination or reduction of inter-
generational wealth transfers would apparently work to reduce the
observed inequality in the distribution of wealth among the young.
The best studies available on the national distribution of wealth in 1860
indicate that in that year, the top 3 percent of U.S. wealth-holding
families owned 45percentof the nation's wealth;47 in 1962 the top 2.5
percentof U.S. wealth-holding consumer units were estimated to own 43
percent of the U.S. private wealth. The role of inter-generational wealth
transfers in explaining the high degree of wealth inequality from genera-
tion to generation has been rejected by numerous scholars because of the
apparent lack of quantitative importance of these transfers to the assets of
the general population. From the data presented in this paper, it appears
that inter-generational wealth transfers are not an important asset source
for 97.5 percent of the population; however, for the top 2.5 percent of
U.S. consumer units, who own 43 percent of the nation's wealth, they
appear to be an important asset source, and an important possible reason
for the persistent inequality in the distribution of wealth observed from
generation to generation.
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8.Ibid., pp. 240—242.
9.Assuming that the wealth could be liquidated and then consumed as income in
retirement. Ibid., pp. 240—242.
10.Projector and Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics, Table 2, p. 12.
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12.See Smith, Franklain, and Wion, Financial Concentration in the US., pp. 11—13.
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14.The information asked in the 1962 survey in regard to trust fund ownership was to
determine the ownership rights to the body of the trust, not to the income alone. If the
consumer unit only had rights to the income from the trust fund, it was not to count the
trust fund assets among its assets. Projector and Weiss, Survey of Financial Charac-
teristics, p. 77. The asset class "estates in probate" was the beneficial interest
of the consumer units in estates still in the process of probate, and whose final
distribution of assets at the time of the survey had not occurred. Projector and
Weiss, p. 66.
15.Data on amounts transferred by the inheritance process from Statistics of Income
1972: Estate Tax Returns, U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service
Publication 764 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 2,6.
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$100,000 or more and with a head under the age of 35 were in the sample), the under
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The absence of millionaires in the under age 25 class does not mean that they do not
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the age of 25) are millionaires by inter-generational wealth transfers. Support for this
thesis comes from Bossons, "The Distribution of Assets," Table V.4, p. 403, in which
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millionaires (25 billion) is stable in the 25 to 35 age class, and in the 35 to 44 age class,
but then more than doubles to over 63 billion in the age 45 to 54 class. This doubling
indicates to me the "arrival" of the so called self-made millionaires later in the life
cycle.
20.Bossons, "The Distribution of Assets," Tables V.16 to V.19, pp. 419—425.
21.ibid.,TableV-19,pp.425—426.
22.Reported inC. S. Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1966), pp. 137—227.
23.Ibid., Table B-i, p. 155.
24.Ibid.
25.ibid., p. 156, Table 8-2.
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Wealth and Income (New York: NBER, 1969).
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education and income concluded that inheritance was of little importance in the
overall distribution of income. Christopher Jencks and Associates, Inequality: A
Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic
Books, inc., 1972), pp. 212—214.
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43.The top 1 percent of U.S. adults in net worthin1969hada net worthofat least
$200,000. Net gifts of $100,000 for twoyearswould be sufficient to place the donee in
the top 1 percent of U.S. adult wealth holders. Data on minimum net worth from
Smith, "The Distribution of Financial Assets," Table 1.
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I want to commend the Conference Program Committee for adding this Student
Papers Session. The importance of stimulating and recognizing graduate
student research through a session like this cannot be overemphasized. Equally
important, students are given a firsthand look at how professional economists
interact and test new ideas through their research and participation in confer-
ences such as this.I hope that the Session can become a regular part of future
Conference programs.
I am honored to have been selected to discuss the three student papers. My
intention is to discuss them one by one, focusing largely on how the papers
might be extended through future work by the authors.
GREG DUNCAN
Greg Duncan comes at the subject of income distribution in a way different from
the earlier papers at this Conference.1 His concern lies in identifying and
measuring the nonpecuniary elements of compensation and, specifically, in
determining how these nonpecuniary rewards might affect estimates of labor
market discrimination against females and blacks. All too often we pay only lip
service to the nonmonetary elements of work compensation, focusing instead
on the readily measured and available money earningsvariable. Yet as readers of
Adam Smith know, these elements must be an integral part of any analysis of
labor markets and of income distribution. In the past, economists have been
thwarted by an absence of data. But fortunately, the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center has taken on the task of gathering much data of use to
economists, including, recently, information not previously available for individu-
als on the nonpecuniary elements of compensation. Thus, we have an opportun-
ity to learn whether the nonmoney components of wages are distributed in such
a way as to shift the relative "full income" position of different race and sex
groups.
The finding that nonpecuniary factors are not in the aggregate distributed in
the same way as income comes as no real surprise, given the way in which they
are measured. Nor is it too surprising that these factors differ by occupations, so
that, say, for women, the advantages derived from certain benefits associated
with the pattern of occupational attachment are offset because, within these
NOTE:Student papers consist of the contributions of Greg Duncan. William A. Johnson, and Thomas
Osn,an.
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occupations, women receive fewer of these benefits than do men of com-
parable backgrounds. And finally, the fact that the somewhat more favorable
flow of these various benefits accrues to females and blacks is still not sufficient
to upset the notion that these two groups suffer from substantial labor market
discrimination.
To nail down these conclusions, we really need to know more about a number
of things which are not touched upon in the paper. For one thing, it is possible
that the greater part-time attachment of women to the labor force affects these
results. It seems possible that for regular full-time workers the differences in
these assorted benefits would be smaller than reported here; part-time work-
ers, whether male or female, probably confront different compensation pack-
ages.
The results obtained may also be affected because no money values have
been placed on the various nonpecuniary benefits. For fringe benefits this could
be done rather easily; instead of simply adding up the number of a rather mixed
bag of benefits received by individuals, it should be possible to assign dollar
values on these benefits. Even though the resulting estimates might be rough,
they would permit an appro)dmation to'full" income. By then entering full
income into the initial regression as the dependent variable, we would be in a
position to compare these new results with those in Duncan's Table 6, and thus
be better able to assess the extent to which our more usual estimates of the
effects of labor market discrimination are biased. However, because the value of
most of the fringe benefits will be proportional to money income, we would not
expect any dramatic shifts to result except inasmuch as different occupations
have different patterns of fringe benefits.
For other items, such as "control over overtime hours" and "job autonomy,"
one might simply assign arbitrary money values which would then further
expand the measure of full income. These items would probably have to be
valued relative to average money income in an occupation, given the fact that all
occupations are being compared in the analysis. Because there might be
disagreement about the value of these items, it would be well to experiment
with a range of values and thereby determine the sensitivity of the results.
Finally, the employment stability aspect might be treated along the lines
suggested by Johnson in his paper.
To summarize, this paper is a highly useful first effort to expand the scope of
that all-important income variable to include both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
rewards. This should help us add to our knowledge of the dimensions of labor
market discrimination and permit us to learn more about the distribution of full
income.2
WILLIAM R. JOHNSON
William R. Johnson's paper is an impressive piece of work, attempting as it does
to explore the systematic forces making for long-run differences in earnings
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levels among occupational groups. In addition to a careful review of what we
know about the subject of uncertainty, he proposes a theoretical model of
earnings, estimates it, and comments on the results. Age groups are used to get
at the lifetime aspects of the problem, and some of the variance is effectively
controlled by stratifying for level of educational attainment. The two major
results seem plausible.
Uncertainty, as reflected by the dispersion variable, is compensated for by
higher average earnings. However, this is not the case when the risk of
unemployment is greater. Whether the effect of the risk of unemployment is
already captured in earnings is not fully clear, however. Perhaps the use of
wage-rate data, hourly orweekly earnings, would permit a more appropriate test
for this latter hypothesis. In any case, the results in Table 2 were a bit perplexing.
While I would expect a one standard deviation in the dispersion variable
to have a larger absolute effect on mean earnings for each successively higher
educational group, and likewise for the prime age groups (35—54 versus 25—34
and 55—64), itis not clear whether the relative effects move in the same
direction, as I would expect they should; listing the mean earnings for each
occupational group would easily resolve this point.
The second set of results pertaining to the association between risk return and
mobility is also consistent with the author's hypothesis. The results are weaker,
however, and one might also question them on the grounds that a different set of
occupational groups is used; hence, the empirical base for the two tests is not
comparable. It would be useful to redo the tests using similardata, to the extent
that this is possible.
Several additional comments might be made. One concerns the stability of the
risk-return relationship. Would one obtain the same results for 1960 or for some
other year? Only by knowing this can we consider accepting the hypothesis, for
the model posits a world in which an individual's future is largely determined by
his initial level of earnings, given the stability of the forces underlying what is
called uncertainty. (I cannot help but comment here on the Ruggles and Ruggles
finding that the cohort of new workers entering the labor market in the early
1 930s seemed to have suffered a permanent impairment of its earnings, relative
to those individuals in the immediately preceding and succeeding cohorts. I have
noticed a similar phenomenon for engineers who obtained their degrees in the
early 1 930s.) Another comment concerns the stability of the relationship when
longitudinal data are examined. It would be useful to test the model with such
data, e.g., the Parnes data or the Michigan Longitudinal Panel. Still another
comment concerns the risk-return and occupational immobility. Here, the
direction of causality is not clear. Should we not expect the proportion of
individuals remaining in an occupation in some subsequent period to be
positively related to the risk-return situation in some initial given year? This
would reflect the fact that those already there prefer to remain in the occupation
to take advantage of their bounty. But what this implies about the proportion of
new entrants coming into an occupation is much less clear. Would we expect
the proportion to be larger or smaller?
A minor point. On the problem of omitted variables, Johnson suggests an
interesting approach in getting at the ability factor. But rather than relying for
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questioned because the preservice occupations may have borne little or no
relationship to postservice occupations, it might be better to build on more
recent data such as the Thorndike-Hagen sample or the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) sample.
Finally, more thought should be given to the use of the term uncertainty to
describe the various forces leading to persistent earnings differences. As used
here, the term embraces far too much, taking into account those factors which
reflect permanent uncertainty. In this sense it is like that old term 'technical
change" which covers a multitude of things we know little about. Let us hope
that we can do a better job of isolating these factors now grouped under
uncertainty as longitudinal data become available to us. Maybe there is
uncertainty arising from not knowing on what earnings track a person will find
himself, but once the choice of a job is made, that uncertainty is forever
dispelled.
TOM OSMAN
Tom Osman has done an interesting job in his effort to throw more light on the
relative constancy of wealth inequality across age cohorts. Both the Lansing-
Sonquist study for the United States and the Atkinson Study for the United
Kingdom indicate that wealth inequality varies little across age cohorts; the
Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC)—Projector data indicate
the same thing. Osman finds this puzzling and properly so, for any reasonable
life-cycle model of earnings and savings would appear to predict a widening of
wealth inequality as cohorts age. Although others have suggested that inter-
generational wealth transfers are responsible for the higher than expected
extent of wealth inequality for the younger age cohorts, Osman attempts to
document this suspicion by drawing upon a variety of secondary data which he
weaves together in a highly effective way. He demonstrates with the scanty data
availablethat recorded large-scaleinter-generational transfers,viatrust,
inheritance, and inter-vivos gifts are inversely related to the age of the cohort,
i.e., they flow most heavily to the younger cohorts, and that, not unexpectedly,
larger proportions of total assets of younger cohorts are held by those with
already high levels of assets, i.e.. transfer wealth is most highly concentrated for
the younger cohorts. Osman's conclusions that these transfers are "important"
cannot be disputed. On the other hand, there may be more to the story, as I
should like to suggest.
I calculated Gini coefficients for his age cohort data—from the Projector data
as tabulated by Bossons—and find that total asset Gini coefficients were .686 for
the 25—34 cohort, .703 for the 35—44 cohort, and .716 for the 45—54 cohort. This
is a slight but virtually insignificant upward drift, which differs from Lansing and
Sonquist, in whose work no trend was apparent. If the Gini coefficients are
recalculated after excluding wealth in trusts, they fall to .620, .696, and .713,
respectively, as would be expected. Of course, the trusts are recorded
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true Girti coefficients would be lowered below the recalculated figures I have just
provided. By exactly how much they would fall cannot be known with certainty in
the absence of a new data source or some ingenious effort to purge the asset
data of previous transfers via trusts. Perhaps this could be done in at least some
crude way, although the sample size will severely limit what can be done. On
another front, it might be possible to look at the asset distribution for those who
have received inheritances. Unfortunately, we shall probably not be satisfied
with whatever we find because of the slender data base at our disposal.
Earlier,I mentioned that there might be more to the story. Assume that a
life-cycle earnings-savings model would lead to a widening of wealth inequality
for successive age cohorts. But now incorporate inter-generational wealth
transfers into the model, such that inequality for younger age cohorts increases
substantially, along the lines described by Osman. Since there seems to be no
reason to assume that the younger cohorts will be less able than other cohorts to
expand their augmented wealth over time, the effect of inter-generational
transfers will simply be to raise the intercept of the Gini slope across cohorts.
Thus, inequality would still be expected to increase with age.
The data, however, do not indicate this to be the case. Moreover, the
magazine Fortune tells us about the continuous emergence of new self-made
millionaires. What this suggests, then, is the old familiar story, of considerable
"churning" in the wealth distribution over the life cycle. Some units move up into
the top of the wealth distribution and others move down, but on balance there
appears to be more downward than upward movement, notwithstanding our
expectations.
Where does this leave us? Clearly we need to know more about the
inter-generational transfer of material and financial wealth, not to mention
human wealth. The extent to which young people vault to the top must be
established. But we shall gain illumination only as we are able to trace Out the
extent of shifting individual fortunes over the life cycle. And if it is true that most
fortunes are depleted almost as fast as they are generated, that is, in two or
three generations, as my comments suggest may be the case, then the
implications for analysis of economic power relationships may be somewhat
different from what is often suggested by analysts of the power structure.
In any case, this is a fascinating subject. I commend Tom Osman for arousing
my curiosity with his extremely useful paper.
NOTES
1.It should be mentioned that this paper reflects the author's early work on what is now a completed
dissertation. This dissertation was awarded the John Parker Prize here at the University of
Michigan. Many of the suggestions I make have already been incorporated into the completed
dissertation, a copy of which can be obtained through University Microfilms.
2.As was pointed out by several participants in the Conference, nobody knows exactly what labor
market discrimination is and to what extent the remaining differences itt income (after correction for
known factors making for differences) between males and females and whites and blacks reflect
discrimination.
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